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Walters: Education for Handicapped Children in Wyoming: What Constitutes a

EDUCATION FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN
WYOMING: WHAT CONSTITUTES A FREE
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION AND OTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE HURDLES
In 1975, Congress amended legislation regarding the education of handicapped children and enacted the Education For All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA or Act), or what has been commonly referred to as
"Public Law No. 94-142."1 The EAHCA is a broad, and somewhat comprehensive legislative statement intended to encourage states to provide
educational services to handicapped children 2 in exchange for limited
federal funding.3 In addition to its substantive provisions, 4 as weln as the
regulations promulgated thereunder, 5 the Act creates a system of procedural guarantees which participating states must provide.8
Since the enactment of the EAHCA, many courts have found7
themselves bombarded with litigation concerning the Act's application.
Any generalization concerning the subject matter of the litigation arising
from the Act would be misleading; however, the major issues may be summarized by two related questions: what procedures do the Act require of
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
2. "Handicapped children" are defined as,
[M]entally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health
impaired children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason
thereof require special education and related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976).
The age range of handicapped children in a state participating under the Act is from
three to twenty-one. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a) (1982).
However, a state is not required to provide services to handicapped children ages three
through five and eighteen through twenty-one if either state law prohibits or does not
authorize the expenditure of public funds in those age groups, or if the requirement is inconsistent with a court order governing educational services to handicapped children in
that state. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (B) (1976); 34 C.F.R. S 300.300(b) (5) (1982).
3. One reason suggested for states participating in the EAHCA regulatory scheme is that it
otherwise places states in compliance with section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974
(29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)) at least with respect to education of handicapped children. See
Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect of Scarce Resources on the Implemnentation of Pub. L. No. 94-142, 14 CoNN.L. REV. 477, 486 (1982).
Although additional remedies may be available under section 504, and possibly 28
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), discussion of these is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of these statutes, see, e.g., Hyatt, Litigating the Rights of HandicappedChildren to
an AppropriateEducation:Procedures and Remedies, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1981).
4. States that participate under the Act must have a licy in effect that "assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education" and have developed a
state plan which demonstrates compliance with specific goals, services, priorities, policies
and procedures. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976). It is noteworthy that section 1412 contains no
language which permits deviation from compliance, such as "if feasible." Section 1412
does provide, however, that certain age ranges may be excluded from coverage, 20
U.S.C. § 1412(2)(3) (1976), and that handicapped children are not required to be educated
with nonhandicapped children if the handicapping condition makes regular classroom
placement inappropriate, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1976).
5. The regulations are found at 34 C.F.R. 99 300.1 - 300.754 (1982).
6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976); 34 C.F.R. 9§ 300.500 - 300.514 (1982). For further discussion of the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Act, see infra notes 73-103 and accompanying text.
7. Obviosy, the impact of the Act is felt most by the local and state educational agencies.
However, discussion of specific impacts and the educational agencies' response thereto
are beyond the scope of this article.
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educational agencies, particularly at the local level; and what entitlements
do the Act create for handicapped children?
Since an array of law review articles have given significant attention to
these issues,8 this comment will concentrate on Wyoming's role in providing education to handicapped students.9 Specifically, Part I will provide
a general overview of the EAHCA and the corresponding Wyoming
statutes, including a discussion of the scope of the statutory provisions. Additionally, this comment will consider how the phrase "free appropriate
public education" has been construed and the implications this construction
has on the development of Wyoming's educational policies. It should be
noted that the constitutional right to education suggests that state law may
require a greater duty to provide an appropriate education to handicapped
children than is required under the Act.
Part II will consider the procedural guarantees provided in the Act and
compare them to the regulatory scheme existing in Wyoming. This part
will also consider the ramifications of recent Wyoming administrative law
developments on the procedural protections in contrast to features the Act
contemplates. As such, this will serve to provide practice pointers to the attorney embarking on this nebulous area of the law.
Part III will discuss issues which have prompted substantial litigation
in state and federal courts. An analysis of the possible impact of these
issues on Wyoming will be provided, as well as discussion of the implications of the future of education of handicapped children in Wyoming.
I.

HANDICAPPED CHILDREN HAVE A RIGHT To
FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION

A

The early to mid-seventies found an increasing federal interest in
education for handicapped children.10 Although education has not been con8. See, e.g., Comment, A Modern Wilderness-The Law of Educationfor the Handicapped,
34 MERCER L. REV. 1045 (1983); Stark, supra note 3; Rebell, Implementation of Court
Mandates ConcerningSpecialEducation:The Problems and the Potential,10 J. L. & ED.
335 (1981); Comment, Self-Sufficiency Under the Education For All Handicapped
Children Act: A Suggested JudicialApproach, 1981 DUKE L.J. 516 (1981); Miller &
Miller, The EducationFor All HandicappedAct:How Well Does ItAccomplish Its Goal of
Promotingthe Least RestrictiveEnvironmentFor Education? 28 DE PAuL L. REV. 321
(1979); Comment, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education:The Education
For AU Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103 (1979); Comment,
Legal Remedies for the Misclassificationor Wrongfil Placement of EducationallyHandicappedChildren, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 389 (1979); Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped:Towards A Definition ofAn AppropriateEducation,50 TEMP.
L.Q. 961 (1977)
9. This comment does not consider the entitlements of handicapped students in higher
education.
10. The EAHCA was a culmination of the increasing federal interest of education for handicapped children. S. REP. No. 168, 94 Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1429-31. The policies of the Act were in part derived from
cases recognizing a constitutional right of handicapped children to an equal education
mandated by Brown v. Boardof Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (right to education
must be available to all on equal terms). See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children
(PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348
F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). For a historical development of the EAHCA, see, e.g., Stark,
supranote 3, at 479-80; Colley, The EducationforAll HandicappedChildrenAct (EHA)
A Statutory and Legal Analysis, 10 J. L. & ED. 137, 137-39 (1981); Haggerty & Sacks,
supra note 8.
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sidered a fundamental constitutional right,11 Congress was impressed with
the substantial number of handicapped students either receiving no education or an inadequate education. 12 Federal legislation ultimately took form
in the Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.
A. General Featuresof the EAHCA
The scope of the Act appears to be quite broad. To be eligible to receive
federal funds' s under the EAHCA, states must have a policy in effect which
"assures all handicapped children [residing in the state] the right of a free
appropriate public education." 14 A "free appropriate public education" is
defined earlier in the Act as:
[Slpecial education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational
agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in
conformity with the individualized education program [IEP] .... 16
The IEP plays a central role in determining whether the local educational agency is providing the handicapped child a free appropriate public
education.1 6 The Act's definition of the IEP describes who should par17
ticipate in the formulation.of the IEP as well as the content of the IEP. It
11. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
12. S. REP. No. 168,94 Cong., 1st Seas. 8,20-21, re-printed in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1425, 1432, 1444-45.
13. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976).
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976).
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976). Special education is defined as "specially designed instruction ... to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction,
instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976). Further, related services are a component of an
educational agency's obligation to provide a free appropriate public education in addition
to special education. Consequently, the statute lists a substantial number of services that
may be necessary to assist the handicapped child benefit from special education. See 20
U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976).
16. Special education and related servides must be provided in conformity with the IEP. 20
U.S.C. § 1401(18XD) (1976). See also, Board of Educ. v. Rowley, - U.S. _
102 S.Ct.
3034, 3049 (1982).
17. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976). This subsection provides:
The term "individualized education program" means a written statement for
each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of the
local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be
qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents
or guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C)a statement of the specific educational services to be
provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation,
and anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria
and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual
basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved. Id.
Coroplare, Wyoming State Board of Education, Rules and Regulations Governing Programs and Services For Handicapped Children in Wyoming School Districts, ch. XI, § 8,
filed February 13, 1981.
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is also apparent that the procedural requirements of the Act directly relate
to the IEP. 18
The provision of a free appropriate public education must be consistent
with standards of the state educational agency. 19 However, the policies and
procedures the state educational agency must develop are prescribed by
the Act. 2 0 Among those policies and procedures are: (1) a goal of providing
full educational opportunity to all handicapped children; 2 ' (2) within a
prescribed age range;2 2 and (3) a method which is designed to identify handicapped children and the extent to which each child may or
2 3may not be
receiving appropriate special education and related services.
Further, the Act requires a participating state to establish certain due
process guarantees,2 4 as well as procedures designed to prevent unnecessary placement outside the regular classroom. 5 Additional procedures must be established to assure that "testing and evaluation
materials and procedures utilized for the purposes of evaluation and placeand administered so as not to
ment of handicapped children will be selected
26
be racially or culturally discriminatory.
Thus, while the substantive requirements of the EAHCA were drafted
very broadly, 27 the significance of the Act's breadth is more apparent when
one considers the application of the supremacy clause in which federal standards preempt inconsistent state laws when that state has accepted federal
18. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). The United States Supreme Court stated that courts must
decide whether the IEP, developed through the procedures required by the EAHCA, is
"reasonably calculated to enable the [handicapped] child receive educational benefits."
Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S.Ct. at 3051.
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (B) (1976).
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (1976).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (A) (1976).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (B) (1976). See also supra note 2.
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (C) (1976).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (A) (1976). The procedural safeguards are set forth at section 1415. In
general, the procedural requirements include notice and opportunity for the handicapped
child's parents to participate in the beginning stages of the identification and evaluation
through the placement stage. Participation includes permitting the parents to challenge
either the identification, evaluation or placement of their child. Provision is made for administrative and judicial review. For further discussion of the procedural safeguards, see
infra notes 73-103 and accompanying text.
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B) (1976) This has been commonly understood as "mainstreaming."
See infra note 64.
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5XC) (1976).
27. See, e.g., Comment, Self-Sufficiency Under the EducationForAll HandicappedChildren
Act: A Suggested JudicialApproach, 1981 DuKE L.J. 516, 519-20 (1981). One rationale
may be that Congress did not intend to interfere with educational policies which have
been the province of the states and, therefore, the broad language of the statutes provides fleibility for state educational policies. See also Comment, Enforcing the Right to
an "Appropriate"Education:The EducationForAll HandicappedChildrenAct of1975,
92 HAav. L. REV. 1103, 1109 (1979).
Another rationale is based on the complexity and unsettled nature of the science of
learning disabilities. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 52,404-05 (1976). Beyond the above noted rationales, the Act contemplates that special education and related services be provided to a
handicapped child based on his or her individual needs. This requirement by itself does
not permit anything but a general statutory directive.
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funds. 28 In this regard, the EAHCA establishes a minimum level of
substantive and procedural guarantees which participating states must
provide to handicapped children.
B. Wyoming Law Governing Education to HandicappedChildren
Before the enactment of the EAHCA, the Wyoming legislature amended the state education code and included a chapter entitled "Program for
Handicapped Children." 2 9 The Wyoming Constitution, unlike the federal
constitution, expressly recognizes a right to education.30 It has been suggested that the 1969 code "include[d] three specific areas which, combined
spell out specifically the right to an education which the State Constitution
guarantees."' 1 One of the specific areas was a program for handicapped
children.a 2
Section 21-14-101 of the Wyoming Statutes provides that "[e]ach and
every child of school age in the State of Wyoming having a mental, physical
or psychological handicap or social maladjustment which impairs learning,
shall be entitled to and shall receive a free and appropriate education in accordance with his capabilities." 3 3 Although the term "handicapped
1983) (Illinois statutory
28. See, e.g., Parks v. Pavkovic, 557 F. Supp. 1280, 1287 (N.D. M11.
scheme invalid under Supremacy Clause); Monahan v. State of Nebraska, 491 F. Supp.
1074, 1091 (D. Neb. 1980), mod. on other grounds, 647 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1981); Vogel v.
School Bd. of Montrose R-14 School Dist., 491 F. Supp. 989,991-93 (W.D. Miss. 1980);
San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. State, 131 Cal. App. 3d 54, 65-66, 182 Cal. Rptr.
525, 532 (1982); Matter of "A" Family, 602 P.2d 157, 166 (Mont. 1979). See also Board of
U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3049-50 n.26 (1982), Crawford v. PittEduc. v. Rowley,
man, 708 F.2d 1028, 1036 (5th Cir. 1983) (EAHCA involves both Congress' power to
legislate under spending clause and to assure equal protection of the laws under section
five of the fourteenth amendment).
Also, the EAHCA has been found not to violate the tenth amendment. See Crawford
v. Pittman, 708 F.2d at 1036-39. Cf., Comment, Self-Sufficiency Underthe EducationFor
All HandicappedChildrenAct: A Suggested JudicialApproach, 1981 DuKE L.J. 516, 524
n. 59 (1981).
29, WYo. STAT. § 21-14-101 to -106 (1977). See Painter & Johnson, The Wyoming Education
Code of 1969, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 531 (1970).
30. Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 23. This section provides: "The right of the citizens to opportunities for education should have practical recognition. The legislature shall suitably encourage means and agencies calculated to advance the sciences and liberal arts."
The Wyoming Constitution also mandates that the legislature "provide for the
establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction,
embracing free elementary schools of every needed kind and grade.... and such other institutions as may be necessary." WYO.CONST. art. 7, § 1. Additionally, the legislature is
required to "make laws for the establishment and maintenance of systems of public
schools which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian
control." WYO.CoNs'r. art. 21,

§ 28.

31. Painter &Johnson, The Wyoming EducationCode of1969, 5 LAND &WATER L. REv. 531,
559 (1970).
32. Id.
33. Wyo. STAT. § 21-14-101 (1977). Another provision in the education code provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, the public school of each school district in the state
over six (6)
shall at all times be equally free and accessible to all children resident therein
years of age and under the age of twenty-one (21), subject to such regulations as the
board of trustees may prescribe." WYo. STAT. § 21-4-301 (1977). Read together, the state
is only obligated to provide education to handicapped children between the ages of 6 and
21. Cf., supra note 2 (states may exclude children between the ages of 3-5 and 18-21 if
ups). However, the p tions
state law does not authorize education for those e
promulgated by the Wyoming State Department or Education, provide for the identification of handicapped children, ages birth through twenty-one. Wyoming State Board of
Education, Rules and Regulations Governing Programs and Services For Handicapped
Children in Wyoming School Districts, 117, fied February 13, 1981 [hereinafter cited as
State Board Rules] (on file at Land & Water Law Review office).
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children" is not defined in the Wyoming Statutes,8 4 section 21-14-101 indicates that the legislature intended to cover a broad category of handicapping conditions. It should be noted that the language of the statute suggests that a handicapping condition which does not impair learning is outside of the statute's coverage. Under its rulemaking authority, s r the State
Board of Education [State Board] has defined certain handicapping conditions such as hearing impairment, mental retardation, multihandicap, orthopedic impairment, other health impairment, social emotional handicaps,
specific learning disability, speech and language handicaps, and visual
handicaps. 8
Children who possess any of the handicaps noted above must be provided "appropriate diagnosis, evaluation, education or training, and necessary
related services. '3 7 Further, if a particular school district cannot provide
the necessary and appropriate programs and services, it must contract
with another school district or agency to obtain them.38 Likewise, if the
program and services cannot be provided anywhere within the state, the
State Board is required to assist the local board of trustees secure those
programs and services outside the state. 9
The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 40 applies specifically to
the provisions related to education for handicapped children. 1 The Wyoming Education Code itself does not specifically authorize or require a hearing under the education for handicapped chilren provisions. However, the
regulations promulgated by the State Board permit parents to "initiate an
impartial due process hearing on any matter pertaining to the identification, assessment, educational placement, or provision
of a free, appropriate
42
public education.., for the handicapped child."'
34. Presumably, the legislature wished that the state board of education, because of its expertise in the area, define "handicapped children." Regardless, the state board defines a
"handicapped child" as "a child or youth who, as a consequence of an individual assessment conducted by a multidisciplinary team comprised of properly certified and endorsed
and/or licensed personnel, is identified as having a mental, physical, or psychological handicap or social maladjustment which impairs learning." State Board Rules, supra note 33,
Appendix E, at 143.
35. WYO. STAT. § 21-14-102 (1977). The state board also has required local school districts to
promulgate rules and regulations to assure that each child receives a free and appropriate
education. State Board Rules, supra note 33, Ch. XI, § 1.
36. State Board Rules, supra note 33, Appendix E,at 143-44. Arguably, the handicapping
conditions indicated in the state board s regulations are not exhaustive, provided that the
handicap fits under the general categories in section 21-14-101 of the Wyoming Statutes.
37. WYO.STAT. § 21-14-103 (1977).
38. Id.
39. Id. The language of this section suggests that the state board may exercise a mediation
function between school districts if one of the districts will not permit the other access to
its programs or services.
A substantial amount of litigation has occurred because the parents wished an out of
state placement that the parents perceived was better, even though the state could provide appropriate services in-state. See inf-a note 173.
40. WYO.STAT. §§ 16-3-101 to -115 (1977).
41.. Wyo. STAT. § 21-2-101 (1977). It is unclear whether this is an exclusive remedy or is intended to govern the procedures to be followed by the state board.
42. State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5(h). Evidently, these rules were adopted to
assure compliance with Sections 1412 and 1415 of the EAHCA.
It is unlikely that, despite the fact no express authority exists for the state board to
promulgate rules and regulations governing procedural guarantees to enforce the provisions of the education code relating to education of handicapped children, the above noted
regulations run afoul of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. First, the state
board has general rulemaking authority under section 21-14-102 of the Wyoming
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The state board regulations also require that a school district provide
notice to parents when it initiates or changes, or refuses to initiate or
change, the identification, evaluation, educational placement of or the provision of free and appropriate education to a handicapped child.4s Finally,
either the school districts or parents may obtain judicial review of the state
board's decision pursuant to Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate
Procedure."
C. Comparisonof the Scope of the EAHCA and the Wyoming Statutes
GoverningEducation of Handicapped Children
Congress' authority to enact the EAHCA is premised in part on its conditional spending power or under a program of cooperative federalism. 4s
The United States Supreme Court has taken cognizance that all states ex4
cept New Mexico receive federal funds under portions of the Act. 6
On the other hand, the Wyoming legislature's authority to enact the
provisions related to education of handicapped children is derived from the
right to education guaranteed by the Wyoming constitution. 47 Indeed,the
Wyoming Supreme Court recently characterized the constitutional right to
education for the children of Wyoming as a "matter of fundamental interest." 4 The Wyoming School Foundation was devised to guarantee a
minimal education for every child by providing state financial assistance to
Statutes. Thus, it is not unreasonable that the state board finds that due process
assurances are necessary to assure that handicapped children receive a free and appropriate education. Second, "agencies are free to fashion their own rules of procedure
and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their duties."
Tri-State Generation v. Environmental Quality Council, 590 P.2d 1324, 1332 (Wyo.
1979).
Further, since Wyoming law has given handicapped children a property interest in
receiving a free and appropriate education, and because liberty interest may arise
because of possible stigma (particularly if a child is labeled "handicapped" and the
parents disagree with the determination by educational agencies), procedural due process
is triggered. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-74 (1975).
43. State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5(a).
44. Id. at ch. XI, § 5(hX12).
45. See, e.g., Battle v. Com. of Pa., 629 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
968 (1981). Stacy G. v. Pasadena Independent Sch. Dist., 547 F. Supp. 61, 73 (S.D. Tex.
1982). One commentator noted that "[t]hrough the use of conditional appropriations,
[Congress'] power to spend becomes a power to regulate." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-10, at 247-48 (1978). Professor Tribe notes that courts have
become generally deferential toward Congress' exercise of its conditional spending
power. Id. at 249-50. See also supra note 28.
46. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, U.S. , 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1982).
47. Painter & Johnson, supra note 31, at 559.
48. Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo.), cert. denied 449
U.S. 824 (1980). Here, the Wyoming Supreme Court viewed a classification based on
wealth to be suspect when applied to a fundamental interest. Id. at 334. Arguably, the
same reasoning should apply to classifications involving handicapped children. Thus, if
children are discriminated against, the relevant statute, or action by the legislature or
educational agencies, must survive strict scrutiny analysis. That is, the action must be
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Id. at 333.
For discussion of jurisdictions that have held right to education under state constitution as either fundamental or not fundamental, see Lujan v. Colorado Bd. of Educ., 649
P.2d 1005, 1016-17 n.11 (Colo. 1982). Although some states view right to education under
state constitution as a fundamental right, handicapped children were not considered a
suspect classification. See, e.g., Levine v. State Dep't of Institutions and Agencies, 84
N.J. 234, 418 A.2d 229, 242-43 (1980). But see Rothstein, Right to EducationfortheHandicapped in West Virginia, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 187, 189 (1983) (strict scrutiny should

apply).
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the local school districts. 4 9 The foundation program must consider not only
basic educational services but also the needs of exceptional and handicapped children.50
The constitutional right to education suggests another difference between the state's obligation to provide education for handicapped children
and requirements the EAHCA imposes on participating states in general.
Both require that handicapped children receive a free appropriate public
education. 5 ' However, the provision of a free appropriate public education
under the respective statutes and the goals they envision are not the same.
The United States Supreme Court, in Board of Education of the Hendrick Central School District v. Rowley,5 2 recently construed the phrase
"free appropriate public education." The Court concluded that a handicapped child is receiving a free appropriate public education if personalized instruction is provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the child
to benefit from that instruction. 3 The Court rejected the argument that
the Act prescribed a substantive standard related to the level of education a
handicapped child was entitled to receive, such as a requirement that states
maximize the potential of handicapped children commensurate with the opportunity provided non-handicapped children.5 4 In fact, a requirement that
states provide equal educational opportunities was considered "an entirely
unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons."65
To the extent that the Supreme Court indicated that the Act did not
create a substantive right to a particular quality of education, the Court's
understanding of the Act seems reasonable. As previously indicated, the
EAHCA establishes a minima 6 of requirements states must be able to
meet to be eligible to receive federal funds. With respect to the provision of
a free appropriate public education, a state complies with the Act if it provides a handicapped child "access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the
handicapped child."'' 6 However, if this means that the Act only guarantees
handicapped children meaningful access to education, measured by the incremental benefits those children may obtain from a program of special
education and related services, the relative worth of that education is
substantially diminished.
Wyoming has not yet been presented with a question related to the
substantive entitlement of handicapped children to a particular kind of
education. The relevant statutory provisions 58 are less helpful than the
49. Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d at 322.
50. Id.
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976); Wyo. STAT. § 21-14-101 (1977).
52. U.S. -,
53. Id. at 3042.
54. Id.

102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982).

55. Id. at 3047. This particular aspect of the opinion is interesting since as the dissent points
out, "[tlhe Act itself announces it will provide a 'fi/ educational opportunity to all handicapped children.' "Id. at 3054 (White, J., dissenting).
56. Or in the Supreme Court's words, "a 'basic floor of opportunity.' " Id. at 3048.
57. Id.
58. Wyo. STAT. §§ 21-14-101 to -106 (1977).
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federal statutes may have been to the United States Supreme Court. In the
state plan prepared for application of federal funds under the EAHCA, the
Wyoming Department of Education stated its educational goals for handicapped children as follows: "all handicapped children as defined in the
[EAHCA] will be provided full educational opportunities in programs
meeting standards established and approved by the State Education Agency."' 59 Additionally, the state plan expresses the Wyoming Department of
Education's policy on priorities for educational services for handicapped
children.60
The regulations promulgated to implement the statutes which govern
education to handicapped children indicate that "each Wyoming school
district is responsible for identifying all handicapped school-age children
who reside in the district and for providing them with a free, appropriate
education."'" Under the regulations, each school district must provide for
the normalization of educational experiences for handicapped children who
are residents of that district, assurance of due process rights of children
and their parents, referral of children for special services, assessment of
those children, individual educational programs, appointment and functioning of a Child Study Committee, graduation of handicapped youths from
high school, in-service preparation for all staff members in the education of
handicapped children, and placements in private schools and facilities. 62
The most notable substantive entitlement of handicapped children contained in the regulations is the requirement that the school district provide
for the normalization of educational experiences.6 8 This requirement more
than any other expresses how the provision of a free and appropriate public
education in Wyoming is to take form. Its ultimate goal is to achieve full59. Wyoming Department of Education, Fiscal Year 1981-1983 State Plan Under Part B of
the Education of the Handicapped Act As Amended by Public Law 94-142 (October 1,
1980) at 9 (on file at Land & WaterLaw Review office). It is not suggested that the state
plan imposes a substantive obligation of educational agencies in the state beyond those
which are in accordance with state law.
60. Id. at 11. The state plan states:
The Department [of Education]'s policy places highest priority on the provision
of a free appropriate public education to handicapped school age children (ages
5 to 21) who are not receiving special education services. The identification,
location and evaluation activities related to suspected handicapped children
(ages 0 to 21) are also considered first priority. Second in priority are those handicapped children, within each disability group, who have the most severe handicaps and who are receiving an inadequate education. Second priority may include handicapped children outside of the state mandated school age (5-21)Jd.
This is consistent with the E AHCA's requirement of priorities of educational services
to handicapped children. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1976); 34 C.F.R. 66 300.320 - 300.324
(1982).
61. State Board Rules, supra note 33, oh. X, § 2.
62. Id. at ch. XI, § 1.The state agency implements the identification of handicapped children
within each school district. Id. at § 2.
63. "Normalization of educational experiences" is not defined in the regulations. The term
basically refers to the process of "assurfing] that to the maximum extent appropriate
handicapped children are educated in regular classes along with children who are not handicapped," id. at § 3(a); however, if regular classroom placement is inappropriate, referral, evaluation and placement of the handicapped child must occur within a continuum of
alternatives ranging from a least restrictive environment to the most restrictive environment. Id. at § 3(a), (b). The continuum of educational alternatives are contained in Appendix A of the State Board Rules. See also, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B) (1976); 34 C.F.R. §6
300.550 - 300.556 (1982).
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time functioning in the regular classroom. 64 The school district, after
evaluation of a given handicapped child, may resort to removal of that child
from the regular classroom environment "only when there is clear evidence
that the learning problems are of such a nature and severity that education
in regular classes, even with the use of supplementary resources, cannot be
achieved satisfactorily." 65 Any deviation from full-time regular classroom
placement also must be provided in the least restrictive environment. 66
Once in a placement other than a regular classroom, the school district
must facilitate movement of the handicapped child toward returning to a
full-time regular classroom placement.67 Of course, a major consideration

in the normalization process is the potential adverse effect of movement
from a less to more restrictive environment and from a more to a less
restrictive environment. 6 From a procedural standpoint, a school district
must justify any classroom placement and subsequent modification by an
individualized educational program. 69
In contrast to the EAHCA, as the United States Supreme Court has interpreted it, Wyoming law and the regulations promulgated by the State
Board of Education envision education of handicapped children as more
than just a meaningful access to public education. Rather, it is viewed to include a meaningful education as well. Put differently, the view expressed
by the dissent in Rowley that "the basic floor of opportunity is ... intended
to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the [handicapped] child will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is
reasonably possible", 70 more closely fits the nature of the handicapped
child's right to education in Wyoming. Arguably, the fact that the constitutional right to eduation in Wyoming is "a matter of fundamental
' also adds support to the proposition that handicapped children
interest"71
must be provided a meaningful education. Thus, to the extent the State of
Wyoming meets only the threshold requirements of the EAHCA, the state
may fall short of its substantive obligation to provide education for handicapped children under the Wyoming Constitution.
It should be noted that under the EAHCA, a free appropriate public
education does not mean that a handicapped child must receive the "best"
education.7 2 Likewise, in Wyoming the provision of a free and appropriate
64. See supra note 63. For a general discussion of promoting placement of children in the
least restrictive environment, or what has been referred to as "mainstreaming," see
Miller & Miller, The EducationForAll HandicappedAct: How Well Does It Accomplish
Its Goal of Promotingthe Least RestrictiveEnvironmentfor Education?28 DE PAuL L.
REV. 321, 324-40 (1979).
65. State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 3(c).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at § 3(f).
69. Id. at § 8. If a conflict arises as to the appropriateness of a proposed educational placement, either the parents or the school district may resort to an impartial due process
hearing. Id. at § 5(h).
70. 102 S.Ct. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting).
71. Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d at 333.
72. See, e.g., Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, N.C. App. -,
293 S.E.2d 687, 689-90
(1982); Buchholtz v. Iowa Dept. of Public Instr., 315 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 1982) (state
standard does not require best or maximum program in the sense of an unlimited commitment of resources and effort to meet the needs of each handicapped child); Rettig v. Kent
City School Dist., 539 F. Supp. 768, 777 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (handicapped child not entitled
to a perfect education, nor is school system required to provide any and all services that
might be beneficial or experiment with novel teaching techniques).
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education does not require that the state provide handicapped children the
best available education. It only requires that the state provide handicapped children educational programs and services designed to eliminate the
effects of the handicap and permit him or her to learn. In other words,
Wyoming law only requires that the state provide handicapped children a
meaningful education.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS RELATED TO
EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN

A. The ProceduralSafeguards Under the EAHCA
Section 1415 of the EAHCA sets forth the procedural safeguards participating states must provide to receive federal funds under the Act.73 As
with the state's obligation to provide handicapped children a free and appropriate public education, section 1415 establishes a minima of due process guarantees which handicapped children and their parents are entitled
to receive. The language of the statute also indicates that states may provide additional procedural safeguards beyond those required under the
EAHCA.74 Alternatively, the supremacy clause applies to preempt conflicting7or nonexistent state laws if the state receives federal funds under the
Act. 6
Among the requirements in the EAHCA are: (1) the parents' rights to
inspect all relevant records of their child;76 (2) written notice to the parents
under certain circumstances,"7 as well as the form of the written notice;78
(3) an impartial due process hearing for complaints concerning the identification, evaluation, educational placement, or provision of a free appropriate public education;7 9 (4) opportunity for administrative review if
73. S. CoNF. REP. No. 455, 94 Cong., lst Seas. 47-50, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1500-1503.
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1) (1976).
75. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1) (A) (1976). In addition to challenging the evaluation of a particular
handicapped child, the parents may obtain an independent evaluation at public expense.
Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.503 (1982). However, if the evaluation is found to be appropriate in
an impartial due process hearing initiated by the local education agency, the parents are
still entitled to an independent evaluation at their own expense. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(b)
(1982).
77. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1) (C) (1976). Written notice must precede any proposal or refusal to
initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of or the provision of a free appropriate public education to a handicapped child. Id. Consent of the
parent is only required before (1) the local educational agency conducts a preplacement
evaluation and (2) the initial placement of a handicapped child in a program other than
full-time regular classroom placement. 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(b) (1) (1982). Also, any
changes in a child's special education program after initial placement only requires prior
notice of such change. Id. at Comment 1.
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1) (D) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.505 (1982). The notice is intended to inform the parents of the actions of the educational agency. If translation into a language
other than English is necessary, the agency has a limited duty to do so. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(b) (1) (D) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.505(b) (2), (C) (1982).
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2) (1976). This paragraph provides in pertinent part:
[T]he parents or guardians shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the
local educational agency or intermediate educational unit, as determined by
State law or by the State educational agency. No hearing conducted pursuant
to the requirements of this paragraph shall be conducted by an employee of
such agency or unit involved in the education or care of the child. Id.
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the state educational agency does not conduct the impartial due process
hearing;80 and (5) judicial review. 8 '
The most notable areas are the requirements of an impartial due process hearing and the scope of judicial review. The Act and the federal
regulations promulgated thereunder concerning impartial due process
hearings8 2 require that state administrative procedures, as determined by
state law or the state educational agency, be followed. 83 Although state administrative procedure may conflict, the hearing officer may not be an
employee of the agency conducting the hearing or be involved in the education or care of the subject child,8 ' or have a personal or professional bias.88
In addition, the hearing rights under the regulations contemplate an adversary proceeding.86
Whether the due process hearing is provided by the state or the local
educational agency is left to the discretion of the states.87 If the state
educational agency conducts the hearing, the decision is deemed final
unless appealed. 88 However, if the local educational agency or any intermediate educational unit conducts the hearing and either party appeals,
the state educational agency must provide an impartial review of the hearing."" The decision which results from the administrative review stage
becomes final unless the aggrieved party seeks judicial review.90
The procedures under the EAHCA contemplate an active participation
by the parents. On the other hand, the fact that a complaining party must
look generally to state administrative procedure as the mechanism for enforcement of the Act presents a potential source for conflict between
20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2) (1976). See also infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2) (1976); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506-509 (1982).
34 C.F.R. § 300.506(b) (1982). However, the Comment to this section permits the use of
mediation prior to a due process hearing. See infranotes 114-18 and accompanying text.
84. 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (1) (1982). See also,e.g., Helms v. McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800, 805 (5th
Cir. 1981) (members of local board may not conduct hearings); Robert M. v. Benton, 634
F.2d 1139, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1980) (Superintendent of Public Instruction may not serve as
a hearing officer because he was an "employee" within contemplation of the Act); Vogel
v. School Bd. of Montrose R-14 School Dist., 491 F. Supp. 989, 995 (W.D. Mo. 1980)
(State Board of Education cannot conduct hearing).
Additionally, the United States Department of Education recently sent out a policy
memorandum indicating that state education employees, chief state school officers and
members of state boards of education were prohibited from serving as either hearing or
reviewing officers under section 1415. United States Department of Education, DAS
Bulletin No. 107 (January 26, 1983).
85. 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (2) (1982). However, bias due to pecuniary interest is not a ground
for disqualification. See id. at § 300.507(b). Cf., Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, N.C. App. -_,293 S.E.2d 687, 691 (1982) (expression of professional opinion between,
e.g., mamstreaming versus residential placement does not violate due process).
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (d) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.508 (1982). But see Rothstein, Right to An
Education in West Virginia, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 187, 206 (1983) (due process hearing
should be approached as a non-adversarial hearing for the purpose of achieving a common
goal).
87. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2) (1976).
88. 34 C.F.R. § 300.509 (1982).
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976); 34 C.F.R. § 300.510 (1982). The regulations permit the
reviewing agency to consider additional evidence at the administrative review stage. 34
C.F.R. § 300.510(b) (1982).
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2) (1976). Cf., 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(c) (1983). Note that section
300.510(c) of the federal regulations refers to section 300.512. This seems to be a
typographical error and should read: "unless a party brings a civil action under §
300.511."
80.
81.
82.
83.
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federal and state law, at least to the extent of resolving questions which
determine the nature of the due process hearing and the scope of judicial
review.9 1 The judicial review provisions under the EAHCA permit an aggrieved party a forum for a92civil action in either an appropriate state court
or in federal district court.
There are two deviations from standard federal administrative law
which appear in the Act: (1) reviewing courts must consider additional
evidence at the request of either party, and (2) the reviewing court must
base its decision on the preponderance of the evidence. 98 It has been suggested that these deviations do not require a reviewing court to accept the
findings of a hearing officer even if supported by substantial evidence.9 4 Indeed, some courts have held that judicial review under the EAHCA is not
limited to the kind of review required by the Administrative Procedure
Act. 95 Additionally, the requirement that the reviewing court receive additional evidence at the request of either party and base its decision on the
preponderance of the evidence, including the authorization to "grant such
relief as the court determines97 is appropriate,"9 6 has been interpreted as
authorizing a de novo review.
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court stated that "the
provision that the reviewing court must base its decision on the
'preponderance of the evidence' is by no means an invitation for courts to
substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the
school authorities which they review." 98 Thus, due weight is to be given to
the administrative proceedings of the educational agencies.99
In the normal case, a party may not obtain judicial review under section
1415 of the Act without having first exhausted their administrative
91. See infra notes 148-61 and accompanying text.
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2) (1976).
93. Id. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not consider additional evidence, but its review of
an administrative agency's action is limited to the record before the agency at the time
the agency made its decision. See, e.g., Wyoming Hospital Ass'n. v. Harris, 527 F. Supp.
551, 559 (D.Wyo. 1981). Also, the standard for review of agency action is whether the
agency's decision is supported by "substantial evidence." See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(a) (E)
(1976); Citizens Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971).
94. Comment, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate"Education:The EducationFor All
HandicappedChildrenAct of 1976, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1103, 1108 (1979). See also, Hyatt,
Litigating the Rights ofHandicappedChildren to an AppropriateEducation:Procedures
and Remedies, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 (1981); Colin K. v. by John K. Schmidt, 715 F.2d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 1983).
Contra, Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, - N.C. App. _
293 S.E.2d 687
(1982) (court applied substantial evidence test); Doe v. Anrig, 561 F. Supp. 121, 124 (D.
Mass. 1983) (standard of review is substantial evidence test).
95. See, e.g., Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 805-06 (1st Cir. 1982).
96. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2) (1976).
97. See, e.g., Colin K. by John K. v. Schmidt, 715 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1983) (EAHCA requires
something short of de novo review); Ronker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (6th Cir.
1983) (EAHCA requires de novo review); Kruelle v. New Castle County School District,
642 F.2d 687, 692 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); Doe v. Anrig, 561 F. Supp. 121, 124 (D. Mass.
1983) (same); Colin V. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375, 1385 (D. R.I. 1982) (same); Workman
v. Scanlon, 528 F. Supp. 1032, 1033 (W.D. Penn. 1981) (same). Contra, Quackenbush v.
Johnson City School District, F.2d -,
Ct. App. No. 82-7695 (2d Cir. August 24,
1983); Lang v. Braintree School Committee, 545 F. Supp. 1221, 1226 (D. Mass. 1982).
98. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S.Ct. at 3051.
99. Id. There may be competing considerations of which courts should be aware. See, e.g.,
Comment, Self-Sufficiency Under the Education For All Handicapped Children Act,
1981 DuxE L. J. 516, 528-33 (1981).
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remedies. 100 However, some courts have not required exhaustion when the
procedures are inadequate or exhaustion would otherwise be futile. 10 '
Finally, the EAHCA requires that the subject child remain in his or her
present educational placement during the pendency of any administrative
or judicial proceeding. 10 2 This has been construed to mean that the handicapped child may not be placed in a less or more restrictive environment
than he or .she was placed before an impartial due process hearing was requested by either party; 103 that is, educational agencies must maintain the
status quo while any review is pending.
B. Due Process Rights of HandicappedChildren in Wyoming
As noted above, the EAHCA requires that participating states provide
certain procedural protections. 0 4 Although the Wyoming statutes indicate
that hearings under the education code are governed by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, 0 there is no express requirement for a hearing under the provisions which govern education of handicapped children.
To comply with the EAHCA, therefore, the Wyoming State Board of
Education promulgated the necessary regulations pursuant to its general
rule-making authority under the provisions concerning education of handicapped children. 06 The State Board regulations generally track the
language of the EAHCA and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Almost as a preamble, the regulations state that: "Due process
assurances are legal expressions of the dignity and worth of children and of
the district's commitment to their healthy development and progress."' 0
At first glance, this statement suggests that the State Board views the due
process assurances as more than a mechanism to ensure that handicapped
10 8
children receive all of the benefits to which the EAHCA entitles them.
Rather, the procedural protections under the State Board regulations
reflect an educational policy of advancing the development and progress of
handicapped children.
However, as noted above, there is little variance between the federal
regulations and the state board regulations. For instance, both require
notice to the parents of any actions by the educational agencies with
respect to the identification, evaluation, educational placement of and the
provision of a free appropriate public education, 0 9 as well as the content of
100. See Hyatt, Litigating the Rights of HandicappedChildren to An AppropriateEducation:
ProceduresandRemedies, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1, 29-34 (1981). See also, Annot., 62 A.L.R.
FED. 376 (1983).
101. Id.
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (3) (1976). This requirement may be waived by consent of all parties.
Id.
103. See, e.g., Stacy G. v. Pasadena Indep. School Dist. 695 F.2d 949, 953 (5th Cir. 1983).
104. See supra note 24.
105. WYO. STAT. § 21-2-101 (1977).
106. See State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5. The State Board's rulemaking authority is derived from section 21-14-103 of the Wyoming Statutes. See also supra note 42.
107. State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5.
108. In Rowley, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the significant degree of participation by parents at every stage of the administrative process. 102 S.Ct. at 3050-52.
Moreover, the Court viewed the procedural safeguards as an enforcement mechanism by

the parents. Id.
109. State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5(a); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a) (1982).
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the notice. 110 Both require the parents be permitted examination of their
Both require the opportunity for independent educachild's records.'
tional evaluation. 112 Both create an entitlement to an impartial due process
hearing subject to judicial review. 113
The most notable difference between the federal regulations and the
state board regulations is the latter's provision for a pre-hearing conference. When the parents or a local school district exercise their right to
initiate an impartial due process hearing, the superintendent of the local
school district and the state superintendent must schedule a pre-hearing
conference."1 4 The pre-hearing conference is an attempt at mediation between the parties, which in part seeks to avoid a due process hearing. 115
However, the regulations indicate that mediation cannot be used to deny or
delay an aggrieved party's rights to an impartial due process hearing."" If
mediation efforts fail, a due process hearing is held." '
The pre-hearing conference (mediation effort) provision seems to suggest that, to the extent that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required, this stage is a prerequisite to an impartial due process hearing. In
this regard, it is possible that a party may successfully challenge a mediation process which is a prerequisite to a due process hearing. Arguably, the
phrase, "if mediation efforts fail,"" 8 in the State Board regulations should
include a refusal to participate in the pre-hearing conference. Additionally,
over-riding considerations may dictate the need to forego a pre-hearing
conference, such as when protection of the handicapped child or other
children is exigent. This consideration applies in the context of
maintenance of the handicapped child's present placement during the
pendency of administrative or judicial proceedings." 9 Likewise, similar
considerations should apply in the context of the pre-hearing stage.
Regarding the specific requirements for impartial due process hearings, the EAHCA requires participating states to provide for an opportunity for such hearings, "as determined by State law or by the State educational agency."' 2 0 Wyoming complies with this requirement through the
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5(b); 34 C.F.R. § 300.505 (1982).
State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5(g); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (1982).
State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.503 (1982).
State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5(h); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506, 300.509 (1982).
State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5(h) (2).
Id. The federal regulations acknowledge that the use of mediation can lead to a resolution
of the difference between parents and educational agencies without developing an adversarial relationship. See comment to 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (1982). The federal regulations,
however, take a position against the use of mediation to deny or delay a due process hear-

ing. Id.
116. State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5(h) (2).
117. Id. at ch. XI, § 5(h) (3). It should be noted that within 45 days after receipt of the request
for hearing, the State Board or its designee must render a written decision. Id. at ch. XI,
§ 5(h) (11). This may suggest that the pre-hearing conference does not extend the 45-day
time period unless all parties consent.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., id. at ch. XI, § 5(h) (3): Despite requirement that the school district must maintain a particular child during pendency of administrative or judicial proceedings, school
district can use its normal procedures for dealing with children who are endangering
themselves or others.
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2) (1976).
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State Board regulations which entitle handicapped children to a hearing
either to challenge a school district's provision of or to enforce the handicapped child's entitlement to a free and appropriate education. However,
the nature of the hearing is unclear. The handicapped child's procedural
due process rights under the fourteenth amendment suggest some
considerations.
A handicapped child in Wyoming derives a right to education both from
a property interest and a liberty interest. Under Goss v. Lopez, 12' a property interest is created by statutory or regulatory entitlements. 2 2 Liberty interests arise from stigma to a person's reputation which may result from
governmental activity. 12 In Goss, the United States Supreme Court held
that a student's property and liberty interest in receiving an education was
sufficient to prohibit a school from imposing suspension on the student
without applying a minimum of procedures required under the due process
clause. 124 In this context the competing interests of the student and the
school are resolved by application of an informal procedure.' 2'
However, in the context of determining whether a handicapped child is
receiving a free appropriate public education, applying an informal procedure will not suffice under the due process clause. A handicapped child,
like other students, has an interest in not being unfairly or mistakenly excluded from the educational process. Unlike nonhandicapped students, the
handicapped child has a specific right to an appropriate education, the
nature of which is described by federal law. Further, the EAHCA's requirements for an impartial due process hearing include the right to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and receive a verbatim transcript
of the proceedings. 2 6 This indicates that a formal procedure is contemplated. Thus, the fourteenth amendment requires a formal hearing
despite the Wyoming education code's failure to expressly provide for one.
The same result occurs under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure
Act. The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act contemplates administrative proceedings which require a hearing and administrative proceedings which do not require a hearing. 27 The former is met by a full
blown trial-type hearing, 128 or "contested case" procedures.129 A contested case is defined as "a proceeding... in which legal rights, duties or
privileges of a party are required by law to be determined after an opportunity for a hearing."180 Under this definition, the entitlement to a hearing
is not dependent on a statute creating the entitlement if state or federal
law otherwise provides for one. In this regard, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment creates an entitlement for a hearing since a handicapped child has a specific property interest in receiving a free appropriate public education under Wyoming's Constitution.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

419 U.S. 565 (1974).
Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 579-83.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1976). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.508 (1982).
Thornley v. Wyoming Hwy. Dep't., 478 P.2d 600, 603 (Wyo. 1971).
Diefenderfer v. Budd, 563 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Wyo. 1977).
See Wyo. STAT. § 16-3-107 (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 16-3-101(b) (ii) (1977).
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The EAHCA also creates a specific right to an "impartial due process
hearing" which must be adopted by states receiving funds under the
EAHCA.' 8 ' It should be recalled that federal preemption applies when a
conflict exists between the procedural requirements of the Act and state
law.18 2 If a state's procedures provide lessprotection than the EAHCA contemplates, the provisions of the Act must be employed.183 Congress' power
to impose the procedural requirements also should survive a tenth amendment challenge. 8 4
Additional considerations indicate that contested case procedures apply to enforce a handicapped child's right to an appropriate education. First,
a free appropriate public education must be provided in accordance with
the IEP. 38 The IEP in turn must describe the handicapped child's current
educational performance, establish short-term objectives and long-term
goals, and the services necessary to achieve those goals. 3 6 Contested case
procedures are particularly suited for determining whether the educational
services, program or placement proposed in an IEP are appropriate.
Second, in this context, contested case procedures also assist in the
development of an adequate record for judicial review. In Boardof County
Commissioners of Teton County v. Teton County Youth Services,'3 7 the
Wyoming Supreme Court stated that "meaningful review of administrative actions requires that an adequate record of the proceedings be
made before the administrative agency. 1 8 Thus, to the extent that contested case procedures are not utilized in an impartial due process hearing,
a handicapped child may be deprived of due process of law. 8 9
In Wyoming, appeal of the impartial due process hearing is direct to
the district court having venue. 140 There is no administrative review of the
hearing by an intermediate educational agency. The State Board regulations provide that: "Appeals from . . . [an impartial due process hearing]
are taken in pursuant to Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure," which applies to judicial review of administrative action.' What
kind of judicial review an aggrieved party is entitled to is the subject of the
section which follows.
C. JudicialReview in Wyoming ConcerningA HandicappedChild's
Right to An AppropriateEducation
The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act governs the availability
of judicial review of administrative decisions." 2 The Wyoming Supreme
131. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2). The phrase "impartial due process hearing" is probably a generic
term for trial-type hearings under state administrative codes.
132. See supranote 28.
133. See, e.g., San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. State, 131 Cal. App. 3d 54, 182 Cal. Rptr,
525, 532 (1982).
134. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
135. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976). Compare Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S.Ct. at 3038.
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976). See also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.340 - 300.349 (1982).
137. 652 P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1982).
138. Id. at 413.
139. See also Comment, Legal Remediesfor theMisclawificationor Wrongfiu Placementofthe
Handicapped Child, 14 CoLuM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 389, 414-18 (1979).
140. Supra note 113.
141. State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 5(h) (12); W.R.A.P. 12.
142. Wyo. STAT. § 16-3-114 (1976). This section provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted and in
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Court has construed the availability of judicial review of administrative
decisions or agency action as a right derived entirely from statutes entitling a person to judicial review. 148 However, restrictions on the availability
of judicial review are not favored and those statutes restricting or
precluding review must be supported by clear and convincing expressions
of a legislative intent to prohibit review. 4 4 Thus, judicial review should be
available when an administrative proceeding, whether or not characterized
child's entitlement
as a contested case, is used to determine a handicapped
145
to an appropriate education under Wyoming law.
On the other hand, the procedure to be followed in obtaining judicial
146
review is determined by rules adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court.
The rules adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court require the aggrieved
party to file a petition for review in the district court having venue.147 A
petition for review must be filed within thirty (30) days after written, cer1 48
tified notice is delivered to all parties of the final decision of the agency.
Additional evidence may only be considered by the reviewing court in contested cases if fraud or misconduct is present at the earlier administrative
proceeding, and, in cases other than a contested case, if the additional
evidence is material." 9 Also, an independent action is available "notwithstanding any petition for review filed.' ' 1 0 Finally, any party aggrieved
by the final decision of the district court may appeal to the Wyoming
Supreme Court.' 51
Administrative law in Wyoming presents additional considerations for
the practicing attorney seeking judicial review of the final decision
resulting from the impartial due process hearing. Most noteworthy are the
decisions interpreting the scope of judicial review. First, the reviewing
court is generally limited to consideration of the record before the agency
at the time when the decision was made. 5 2 Second, de novo review is
generally unavailable for review of administrative decisionmaking or
the absence of any statutory or commonlaw provision precluding or limiting
judicial review, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final
decision of an agency in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction,
...

is entitled to judicial review.... Id.

143. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, 575 P.2d 749, 750 (Wyo.
1978).
144. Id.
145. See, e.?., Diefenderfer v. Budd, 563 P.2d 1355, 1359-60 (Wyo. 1977) (judicial review
authorized for noncontested case because Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act does
not limit review only to contested cases but also to "any other agency action").
146. Wyo. STAT. § 16-3-114(a) (1982).
147. W.R.A.P. 12.03. Note that all appeals from administrative agencies and all proceedings
for trials de novo reviewing administrative action are governed by this rule.
148. W.R.A.P. 12.04.
149. W.R.A.P. 12.08. In contested cases additional evidence which is material must first be
considered by the agency.
150. W.R.A.P. 12.12. However, the Wyoming Supreme Court in Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas
Association v. State, 645 P.2d 1163 (Wyo. 1982), limited the use of Rule 12.12 to
challenges concerning the validity and constitutionality of agency regulations or the constitutionality or interpretation of a statute upon which the administrative action is, or is
to be, based. Id. at 1168. For a discussion of the implications of this decision, see Battle,
Administrative Law, Wyoming Style, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 223, 224-240 (1983).
151. W.R.A.P. 12.11.
152. See, e.g., W.RA.P. 12.09 (review confined to the record); Wyoming Hospital Ass'n v.
Harris, 527 F. Supp. 551,559 (D. Wyo. 1981). See alo supranote 149 and accompanying
text.
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agency action.1 58 And third, the standard for review is whether the decision
by the agency is supported by substantial evidence. 15 '
As previously indicated, the EAHCA deviates from general federal administrative law by requiring that the reviewing court consider additional
evidence at the request of either party and by requiring that the reviewing
court base its decision on the preponderance of the evidence. 156 Although
this appears to depart from the deference reviewing courts generally afford the decisionmaking of administrative agencies, 66 the United States
Supreme Court indicated that the Act carried an implied requirement that
due weight was to be given to the administration proceedings. I" On the
other hand, some courts view the expansive provisions under the Act con58
cerning the scope of judicial review as contemplating de novo review.
Almost immediately, the variances between the kind of judicial review
available in Wyoming and the kind of review the EAHCA contemplates
becomes apparent. Under the EAHCA, the requirement that the reviewing
court receive additional evidence appears to be a matter of right. In contrast, a Wyoming court which reviews an administrative decision may consider additional evidence only if a showing is made that the evidence is
material or if fraud or misconduct was present in the earlier proceeding.
Due process or the need for an adequate record may dictate that the
reviewing court consider additional evidence. 159 In practice, however, a
court probably will remand to the agency to more fully develop the record
by considering additional evidence. 16°
Changing the standard of judicial review of the administrative determination regarding a handicapped child's right to an appropriate education
from the substantial evidence test to a decision based on the preponderance
of the evidence presents more difficulty. In Wyoming, unlike the federal
system,' 6 1 the rules for judicial review adopted by the Wyoming Supreme
Court supercede existing statutory provisions.' 62 Also, Rule 12.09 limits
153. See, e.g., City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, 647 P.2d 1378,1382-83 (Wyo. 1982). See also Battle, Administrative Law, Wyoming Style, 18 LAND & WATER L. REv. 223, 249-263
(1983).
In City of Evanston, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act replaced the trial de novo provisions. 647 P.2d at 1384. Compare, City of Casper v. Regan, 433 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1967) (same).
(E) (1977). Note that this provision applies to hearings
154. See Wyo. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (ii)
provided by statute. Id. Presumably, this refers to contested case proceedings.
155. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 805 (1st Cir. 1982) (review mechanism under
EAHCA stands in sharp contrast to the usual situatiuon where a court is confined to examining the record made before the agency and to determining whether the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence).

157. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S.Ct. at 3051.

158. See supranote 97.
159. See W.R.A.P. 12.07. Cf., W.R.A.P. 12.08. See also, Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Teton
County Youth Services, Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 413-16 (Wyo. 1982) (although record was deficient and court could have taken additional evidence, Board required to develop record
under a contested case procedure).
160. Id.
review provisions under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act are sub161. The
ct.judicial
to additional
requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law. 5
U6S.C. § 559 (1976).
162. Wyo. STAT. § 16-3-114(b) (1977).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1984

19

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 19 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 13
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIX

review to those matters specified in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. 16 3 Additionally, because of case law on the subject, review de
novo is unavailable in Wyoming for review of administrative decisions
regarding the handicapped child's right to an appropriate education.16 4
Again, when state law conflicts with the procedural requirements of
the EAHCA, as it does in Wyoming with respect to the scope of judicial
review, the Act controls. 165 In San Francisco Unified School District v.
State, the court held that the provisions of the EAHCA should be employed
where state review procedures provide less protection or a more limited
scope of review. 16 This may present some tenth amendment difficulties;
however, the nature of Congress' power to enact the EAHCA should shield
it from attack under the tenth amendment. The court in Crawfordv. Pittman,1 6 7 recently concluded that the EAHCA is not subject to tenth amendment limitations under a National League of Cities v. Usury (NLC)
analysis.168
The Crawford court viewed Congress' power to enact the EAHCA as
an exercise of its spending power and to assure equal protection of the laws
under section five of the fourteenth amendment. 6 9 Regarding the Act as
spending power legislation, it held that the voluntary nature of the Act
precluded application of NLC."70 The Crawford court also noted that
statutes enacted pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment are
not subject to the limitations of NLC.'7 ' Although the reasoning of the
court is not very expansive, the opinion in Crawford should provide reviewing courts some guidance in resolving questions of the tenth amendment's
applicability to the EAHCA.
163. W.R.A.P. 12.09. The rule limits review to those matters in section 16-3-114(c) of the
Wyoming Statutes, which provides in pertinent part:
[Tlhe reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability
of the terms of agency action. In making the following determinations, the
court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
iii)" Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found
to be:

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse or discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(D) Without observance or procedure required by law; or
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the
record of an agency hearing provided by statute.
WYO. STAT. § 16-3-113(c) (1982).
It is unclear to what extent the supremacy clause may apply to preempt the rules for
judicial review of agency action adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court.
164. See supra note 153.
165. See supra note 28.
166. 131 Cal. App. 3d 54, 182 Cal. Rptr. 525, 532 (1982).
167. 708 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1983).
168. Id. at 1037-38.
169. Id. at 1036.
170. Id. at 1037. CompareComment, Self-Suficiency Underthe EducationForA UHandicapped Children Act:A Suggested JudicialApproach,1981 DuKE L. J. 516, 524 n.59 (1981).
171. Id.
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Thus, the practicing attorney is encouraged to familiarize him or
herself with the due process assurances provided under the EAHCA, the
State Board's regulations, and Wyoming administrative law. 172
III.

THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE OF A HANDICAPPED CHILD'S
RIGHT TO AN APPROPRIATE EDUCATION IN WYOMING

In the 1976-77 academic year a total of 7,598 Wyoming students between the ages of three and twenty-one1 73 were identified to receive services under P.L. 94-142.1'4 This represented 7.45% of the total statewide
student population.' 75 Six years later, in the 1982-83 academic year, the
total number of children in the same age category who received services
under the Act rose to 9,837. 17 Correspondingly, this represented 9.36% of
the total school population. 1 77 The above figures reflect a growing handicapped student population whose impact on Wyoming education law has
largely gone unnoticed.
This may be due in part to the relatively low number of challenges 7to8
local school district's implementation of the EAHCA since its inception.'
It would not be unreasonable to project, however, that as case law develops
nationally in the area of education to handicapped children, including the
possibility of a lesser degree of federal regulation, 1'7 9 Wyoming will experience its share of having to determine the scope of a handicapped child's
entitlement to an appropriate education and the educational agencies'
obligations thereunder.
A. PotentialAreas of Controversy
Should an issue arise before a Wyoming court as to the appropriateness
of a handicapped child's education, a preliminary question which should be
172. The attorney should also be familiar with any rules and regulations a local school district
has promulgated since the State Board regulations require local school districts to promulgate rules and regulations for education of handicapped children. State Board Rules,
supra note 33, ch. XI, §§ 1-2.
173. The area of greatest concentration was students between the ages of six to twenty-one
(7268).
174. These statistics were compiled by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (the
Department of Education became a separate department under President Carter's
reorganization) in Washington, D.C. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
State Child Count Profile - Wyoming (1977).
175. Id.
176. From Department of Education, Report of Handicapped Children Receiving Special
Education and Related Services Under P.L. 94-142 and P.L. 89-313, School Year
1982-1983, Wyoming (June 27, 1983). These statistics were compiled by the Department
of Education, Washington, D.C. The area of greatest concentration was ages 6-17.
177. Id. It was suggested a few years ago that approximately ten percent of America's school
age population are handicapped children. Haggerty & Sacks, Educationof the Handicapped: Towards A Definition of An AppropriateEducation, 50 TEMP. L. Q. 961 (1977).
178. Interview with Gayle R. Lain, Ed.D., Director of the Special Programs Unit, Department
of Education, State of Wyoming, in Cheyenne, Wyoming (October 4, 1983). According to
Dr. Lain, only three complaints reached the impartial due process hearing stage since the
EAHCA took effect. In addition, no civil actions have been brought thus far against a
local school district or the Department of Education concerning the education provided or
not provided a handicapped child.
The Department, on the other hand, in the time period from July 1982 through
September 1983, received seven (7) formal hearing requests. Seven (7) mediations followed with one resulting in an impartial due process hearing. The issues presented involved
challenges to placement or programs, evaluations and funding of placements.
179. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
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considered is the parameters of a handicapped child's right to an education
guaranteed by the Wyoming Constitution. Only after resolution of this
question may the appropriateness of a particular education program, as
well as the scope of a school district's obligations therein, be determined.
Although a myriad of individual circumstances may give rise to disputes,
three areas of controversy have frequently reached the courts: (1) the appropriateness of residential placement; (2) school discipline of handicapped
children; and (3) the provision of an educational program that extends
beyond the regular school year.
(1) ResidentialPlacnent
Residential placement disputes may occur in at least two contexts. The
first involves a determination by a local school district that it does not have
the resources to provide the types of services a particular handicapped
child requires. Obviously, residential placement should not occur if the child
can be educated in a less restrictive environment. 80 However, the Wyoming Department of Education has noted that Wyoming has several unique
factors which present obstacles to alternative educational placements according to the needs of handicapped children, 1 1 resulting in potentially
greater use of residential placements. Specifically, some of the factors are:
(1) low numbers of handicapped children; (2) low incidence of handicapping
conditions; (3) size of districts in rural or remote areas; (4) difficulty
and (5) lack of
recruiting special education personnel because of isolation;
82
facilities because of impact in energy producing areas.
Residential placement disputes may also arise when the parents believe
that a particular facility is best adapted for their child's needs.18 This
dispute is most frequent when the local or state agency believes that an appropriate placement exists somewhere else within the district or the
state. 1'8 4 In either context, the inquiry ultimately rests on a determination
whether a residential placement is appropriate and necessary for educational reasons. 85 A more difficult question occurs when a child's problems,
which may not be related to educational disabilities (such -as emotional,
180. See, e.g., State Board Rules, supra note 33, ch. XI, § 3(a) (to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children must be educated in regular classes along with children
who are not handicapped, however, placement of handicapped children in regular classes
must be appropriate to their needs); Abrahason v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 227 (1st
Cir. 1983) (residential placement is appropriate if handicapped child's needs are such that
any educational progress would not occur in its absence). See generally, Annot., 23 A.L.R.
4th 740 (1983). See also Mooney & Aronson, Solomon Revisited: SeparatingEducational
and Other Than EducationalNeeds in Special Education Residential Placements, 14
CoNN. L. REv. 531, 537-45 (1982).
181. Wyoming Department of Education, Fiscal Year 1981-1983 State Plan Under Part B of
the Education of the Handicapped Act As Amended by Public Law 94-142 (October,

1980).

182. Id. at 35. See also, Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect of Scarce
Resources on the Implenentation of Pub. L. No. 94-142, 14 CoNN. L. REV. 477, 491-95
(1982).
183. It should be noted that a handicapped child is not entitled to a particular program considered by the parents to be superior to the one recommended by the local educational
agency through an individualized education program. See, e.g., Springdale Sch. Dist. #50
o Wash. v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1982) (although a particular facility may offer
handicapped child the best educational opportunities, EAHCA does not require states to
make available best possible option); Buchholtz v. Iowa Dept. of Public Instruction, 315
N.W.2d 789, 794 (Iowa 1982) (one district's program is not inappropriate merely because
another district has a better program).
184. Id.
185. See supra note 170.
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social or medical problems), adversely affect his or her ability to learn and
thus interfere with his or her educational progress. The rule that emerges
from these situations is that if as child's noneducational problems are so
linked or interwoven with his or her learning disability that residential
placement is appropriate and necessary, the educational agency is responsible for providing the placement.186
To the extent that educational problems can be separated from
noneducational ones, the Wyoming statutes attempt to prescribe how the
costs of court ordered placement of children in private residential treatment facilities and group homes are to be allocated. 187 The statute contemplates reimbursement by the Department of Education to the Department of Public Assistant and Social Services. 8 Additionally, periodic
review of the placement is required, among other things, to determine if
the placement is educationally inappropriate or not the least restrictive
alternative available. 89 If the placement is inappropriate, the placement is
referred back to the district court with a recommendation by the local team
of an appropriate placement. 190
(2) School Discipline
Another area of interest concerns the extent to which handicapped
children may have unique rights under a school's system of discipline. The
EAHCA is silent on the issue of school discipline of handicapped children
and thus far the Department of Education has not addressed the issue in
regulations.' 9 ' However, some courts have been presented with questions
regarding the scope of an educational agency's disciplinary procedures on
handicapped children. 192 The conclusion drawn by these courts has been
that expulsions and indefinite suspensions are changes of placement within
186. See, e.g., San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. State, 131 Cal. App. 3d 54, 182 Cal. Rptr.
525, 534-36 (1982); Kruelle v. New Castle County Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 692-97 (3d
Cir. 1981); North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Ed., 471 F. Supp. 136, 139-41 (D.D.C.
1979). See also Papacoda v. State, 528 F. Supp. 68, 71-72 (). Conn. 1981) (placement
necessary for child to learn).
187. Wyo. STAT. § 21-13-315 (Supp. 1983).
188. Wyo. SWAT. § 21-13-315(b) (Supp. 1983).
189. Wyo. STAT. § 21-13-315(b) (v) (Supp. 1983). This determination is made by a local team
consisting of representatives of the child's school district of residence, the child's
caseworker, the county division of public assistance and social services and other appropriate personnel. Wyo. STAT. § 21-13-315(b) (ii) (Supp. 1983).
190. WYo. STAT. § 21-13-315(b)(v)(Supp. 1983). Section 21-13-315 became effective on July 1,
1983. The Department of Education and the Division of Public Assistance and Social Services are required to jointly adopt rules to implement this section. Until these rules are
promulgated it would be premature to comment on its potential impact. Note that this
section only applies to court ordered placements of children in residential treatment
facilities or group homes.
191. It should be noted that the Department of Education has proposed regulations regarding
disciplinary rules and procedures. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33,836 (August 4, 1982). The proposed regulations indicate that a handicapped child cannot be subjected to a disciplinary
sanction which, "requires a hearing by law or agency policy before determining that the
child's behavior was not caused by the child's handicapping condition." Id. at 33,839.
However, the proposed regulations are not "intended to affect any additional due process
requirements imposed by Federal or State law regarding disciplinary procedures." Id. at
33,840.
192. Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982); S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.
1981); H. R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. 215 (D. Md. 1981); Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225
(N.D. Ind. 1979); Sherry v. New York State Ed. Dept., 479 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D.N.Y.
1979); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978). See also Comment, School
Discipline and the Handicapped Child, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1453 (1982).
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the contemplation of the EAHCA19 3 and, before such disciplinary actions
may be implemented, the educational agency must determine whether the
child's handicapping condition
caused the behavior which was the subject of
19 4
the disciplinary action.
None of the courts have suggested that a handicapped child is never
subject to a school's disciplinary procedures. 96 Indeed, a handicapped child
may be temporarily suspended without resort to the procedures under the
Act, 9 6 and may be expelled in appropriate circumstances when the Act's
procedural protections are followed.1 97 Additionally, courts have rejected
the claim that the additional protections for handicapped children from expulsion creates a double standard for student conduct. 198
In Wyoming, no distinction is made between the nonhandicapped child
and the handicapped child concerning school disciplinary procedures, either
in the education code or in the State Board regulations. Presumably, the
existing statutes are to apply to both. 9 9 Suspension periods cannot exceed
a maximum of ten (10) days,2 0 0 and suspension cannot physically occur until
the student is given "an opportunity
to be heard and to present his version
' 20 1
of the charges against him."
On the other hand, if a student is to be expelled, the student has a right
to hearing pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 2 0 2 in
which contested case procedures apply. 203 However, when a handicapped
child is the subject of expulsion, there are no statutes or regulations to
guide the administrative tribunal or the district court under judicial review.
Under these circumstances, an impartial due process hearing should be
held to determine if the child's behavior is caused by his or her handicapping condition, and if so, the Child Study Committee should convene to
reconsider whether the child's behavior justifies a more restrictive educational placement. 20 4 Alternatively, if the behavior is not because of his or
193. See, e.g., Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d at 601; S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 348; Sherry v.
New York State Ed. Dept., 479 F. Supp. at 1337; Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. at 1241.
194. See, e.g., S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 346; Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. at 229.
195. See, e.g., Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. at 1243.
196. See, e.g., Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d at 602; Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. at 229; Sherry v.
New York State Ed. Dept., 479 F. Supp. at 1337; Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. at 1242.
However, the procedural protections which also apply to nonhandicapped students must
be followed. Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d at 602.
197. See, e.g., S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 348; H.R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. at 219.
However, the behavior must not be a manifestation of the child's handicap. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d at 348; Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. at 229.
198. See, e.g., Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d at 601.
199. See WYO.STAT. §§ 21-4-305 to -306 (1977).
200. Wyo. STAT. § 21-4-305(a) (1977).
201. Wyo. STAT. § 21-4-305(b) (1977). This language comes right out of a United States
Supreme Court case. Goss v.Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). Section 21-4-305(b),
however, provides a student an unqualified right to present his side of the story, in contrast with Goss which only requires an opportunity for response if the student denies the
charges made against him. See 419 U.S. at 581. Of course, the statute provides for
emergency suspensions, in which case an opportunity to be heard and to respond must occur no later than seventy-two (72) hours. Wyo. STAT. § 21-4-305(c) (1977).
202. Wyo.STAT. § 21-4-305(d) (1977).
203. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
204. Some courts have determined that the EAHCA requires this approach. See, e.g., Kaelin v.
Grubbs, 682 F.2d at 600-01; Doe v. Kroger, 480 F. Supp. at 228-29; Stuart v. Nappi, 443
F. Supp. at 1242.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol19/iss1/13

24

Walters: Education for Handicapped Children in Wyoming: What Constitutes a
1984

COMMENTS

her handicap, the handicapped student may be expelled on the same basis
as nonhandicapped children.20 6
(3) Extended School Year

Finally, another significant issue involves a school district's obligation
to provide educational services to handicapped children beyond the regular
school year. In Wyoming, the relevant statute provides that: "Each school
district shall operate its schools and its classesfor a minimum of one hundred seventy-five (175) days each school year."2 06 Read in pari materia
with section 21-14-101,207 a school district seems to be required to furnish a
full year program for a handicapped child if this is necess
to provide the
handicapped child an appropriate education. Again, the difficulty in resolving this issue is that neither the EAHCA, the federal regulations, the
Wyoming Statutes nor the State Board regulations offer any express
guidance to the state or local educational agencies.
It has been held that a blanket policy which does not permit the provision of any educational services beyond the regular school year is violative
of the Act.208 However, the complainant may be required to demonstrate
that the handicapped child will substantially regress during the summer
recess if the child is not provided a full year program. 09s Additionally, funding limitations have not been found a sufficient justification for a policy
which precludes
the provision of educational services beyond the regular
210
school year.
Inadequacy of funds is one reason the issue of providing handicapped
students with educational services beyond the regular school year may
become a significant issue under the EAHCA.211 A state educational agency with limited funding might conclude that a policy in which available
funds are expended in an equitable manner such that no child, handicapped
or nonhandicapped, is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education would survive a challenge.2 12 However, if scarcity of funds actually
205. See, e.g., Doe v. Kroger, 480 F. Supp. at 229. Admitted]y, consideration whether a handicapped child's behavior is an outgrowth of the chid's handicapping condition isadifficult question to resolve; particularly, for example, if the handicapped child also has been
adjudicated a child in need of supervision or delinquent. Resolution of this question,
however, should not be more difficult than a determination of educational placement at
the IEP stage.
206. Wyo. STAT. § 21-4-301 (1977) (emphasis added).
207. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
208. See Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028, 1035 (5th Cir. 1983); Battle v. Com.of Pa., 629
F.2d at 276; Yaris v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis County, 558 F. Supp. 545,559 (E.D.
Mo. 1983).
One court has held that in ascertaining a handicapped student's entitlement to extended school year services, the state educational agency should consider at least: (1) the
nature and severity of the student's handicapping conditions; (2) the areas of learning

crucial to attaining the goal of self-sufficiency and independence from caretakers; (3)the

209.
210.
211.
212.

extent of regression caused by interruption in educational programng; and (4) the rate
of recoupment following interruption in educational programming. Lee by Lee v. Thompson, Current EHLR Dec. 554:429, 430 (D. Hawaii 1983).
See, e.g., Battle v. Com. of Pa., 629 F.2d at 276 n.9; Phipps v. New Hanover County Bd.of
Educ., 551 F. Supp. 732, 734 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
See, e.g., Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d at 1035; Yaris v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis
County, 558 F. Supp. at 549.
See Stark, TragicChoices in SpecialEducation:The Effect of Scarce Resources on the Implementation of Pub. L. No. 94-142, 14 CoNN. L. REV. 477, 501-02 (1982).
Such a conclusion may be drawn from some of the language in Rowley. See 102 S.Ct. at

3044 n.15.
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bears more heavily on the handicapped child, the policy may be viewed as
conflicting with the Act.218 Thus, some courts on judicial review have considered whether the educational agency's claim that a handicapped child is
of a
receiving a free appropriate public education within the confines
214
regular school year is motivated in part by funding limitations.
B. Uncertaintyin the Law ConcerningEducationof HandicappedChildren
One commentator stated that: "The Reagan Administration's 'new
2' 15
federalism' calls for a drastic reduction of the federal role in education.
In response, the United States Department of Education planned to amend
some of the regulations previously promulgated under the EAHCA. 21s The
amendments were intended to "[1] reduce fiscal and administrative
burdens on recipients . . . , and [2] to address various problems that have

arisen... since the current regulations became effective

....

",217

However,

because of a strong negative response to the proposals, the Department of
Education withdrew several of the proposals. 218 Nonetheless, there is a
of
concern that "endless ... attempts to diminish even further the rights
' 219 will
handicapped children to obtain a free appropriate public education
continue into the future.
The potential economic impact resulting from the award of damages
22 0
under the EAHCA may give rise to a further backlash on the EAHCA.
Generally, damages are not available under the Act because of an educational agency's failure to provide a handicapped child a free appropriate
public education. 22 1 However, damages may be available under exceptional
circumstances, 22 2 or at least to the extent of reimbursement for tuition and
expenses related to providing an appropriate educational placement for a
handicapped child. 2 2 Should a trend develop in favor of awarding damages
213. Id. See also Yaris v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis County, 558 F. Supp. at 559.
214. See supra text accompanying note 210.
215. Levin, Equal Opportunity For Special Pupil Populationsand the Federal Role, 85 W.
VA. L. REV. 159, 159 (1982-83).
216. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,836 (Aug. 4, 1982).
217. Id.
218. See 47 Fed. Reg. 49,871-72 (Nov. 3, 1982). One of the proposals not withdrawn concerned
the proposals on disciplinary rules and procedures. See also Beyer, A FreeAppropriate
Public Education, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 363, 387-89 (1983); Comment, A Modern
Wilderness-The Law of Education for the Handicapped, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1045,
1067-70 (1983).
219. See Beyer, supra note 218, at 1070.
220. For a good discussion of damages under the EAHCA, see Hyatt, Litigatingthe Rights of
Handicapped Children to An Appropriate Education: Procedures and Remedies, 29
UCLA L. REV. 1, 42-51 (1981).
A related issue is the liability of an educational agency for educational malpractice.
See generally Comment, Educational Malpractice and Special Education Law, 55
CHI.[-]KENr L. REV. 685 (1979). Discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
221. See, e.g., Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 811-12 (1st Cir. 1982); Meiner v. State of Mo., 673
F.2d 969, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1206 (7th Cir.
1981); Hurry v. Jones, 560 F. Supp. 500, 505 (D.R.I. 1983).
222. See, e.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d at 1214 (school's failure to provide services
necessary to protect physical health of the child when the school otherwise has an obligation to provide those services, and when school acts in bad faith by failing to comply with
procedural provisions of the Act); Hurry v. Jones, 560 F. Supp. at 505-06.
Although not an action under the EAHCA, one court awarded damages for
misclassification of a handicapped child. See Hoffman v. Bd. of Ed. of City of New York,
64 A.D.2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).
223. See, e.g., Matthews v. Ambach, 552 F. Supp. 1273, 1278-80 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
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under the Act, it can be anticipated that some states may re-evaluate the
benefits derived from the EAHCA and conclude that the burdens outeigh
the benefits.
If these concerns become a reality, a question arises as to what alternatives are available to enforce whatever rights handicapped children have
to an appropriate education. Obviously, one's remedy may still be available
under state law, although there may be less incentive to provide the educational services to handicapped children contemplated under the current
federal law.
Notwithstanding, the EAHCA has created a greater awareness of the
significant disparity which has existed regarding education of handicapped
children. In this regard, the forecast for education of handicapped children
in Wyoming appears to be very promising.
CONCLUSION

This comment was not intended to be an exhaustive discussion on the
sources of the handicapped child's right to an education. However, three
things should be recalled from the above discussion. First, the Education
For All Handicapped Children Act established that handicapped children
are entitled to a free appropriate public education. States, such as Wyoming, which receive federal funds under the Act must provide handicapped
children residing within its borders the minimum education the Act
provides.
Second, a child in Wyoming has a constitutional right to education
which has been characterized a matter of fundamental interest. This also
applies to handicapped children in Wyoming. Thus, Wyoming law imposes
a greater substantive obligation on educational agencies to provide education to handicapped children than does the EAHCA. On the other hand, a
handicapped child is not entitled to the best possible education. Third, the
due process rights required by the EAHCA are very broad. The hearings
themselves are determined by state law or the state educational agency.
However, if this conflicts with the EAHCA, the Act controls. Therefore,
particular attention should be paid to developments in Wyoming
administrative law.
The attorney representing a handicapped child must view furthering
the best interests of the child as the ultimate goal under the handicapped
child's educational program.
ROBERT J. WALTERS
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